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STATE OF FLORIDA
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION

FLO-RONKE, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.
_______________________________/

DOAH CASE NO. 15-0982
AHCA CASE NO. 2014011256
FILE NO. 11964826
LICENSE NO. 9399
FACILITY TYPE: ASSISTED LIVING FACILITY

FINAL ORDER

These cases were referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings where the assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), John D. C. Newton II, conducted a formal administrative hearing. At issue in this case is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration ("Agency") correctly denied Petitioner's assisted living facility ("ALF") licensure renewal application based on the fact that it failed to pay a fine, and that it employed an individual in a position that required background screening who had a disqualifying criminal conviction. The Recommended Order dated October 30, 2015, is attached to this Final Order and incorporated herein by reference, except where noted infra.

RULING ON EXCEPTIONS

Both Petitioner and Respondent filed exceptions to the Recommended Order.

In determining how to rule upon the parties' exceptions and whether to adopt the ALJ's Recommended Order in whole or in part, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("Agency" or "AHCA") must follow section 120.57(1)(*l*), Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part:

> The agency may adopt the recommended order as the final order of the agency. The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law over which it has substantive jurisdiction and interpretation of administrative rules over which it has substantive jurisdiction. When rejecting or modifying such

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> conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule, the agency must state with particularity its reasons for rejecting or modifying such conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule and must make a finding that its substituted conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule is as or more reasonable than that which was rejected or modified. Rejection or modification of conclusions of law may not form the basis for rejection or modification of findings of fact. The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. . . .

§ 120.57(1)(*l*), Fla. Stat. Additionally, "[t]he final order shall include an explicit ruling on each exception, but an agency need not rule on an exception that does not clearly identify the disputed portion of the recommended order by page number or paragraph, that does not identify the legal basis for the exception, or that does not include appropriate and specific citations to the record." § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. In accordance with these legal standards, the Agency makes the following rulings on the parties' exceptions:

Petitioner's Exceptions

In its first exception (titled Exceptions to Preliminary Statement), Petitioner takes exception to the Preliminary Statement, disputing the procedural history of the case laid out by the ALJ. However, the Preliminary Statement contains neither findings of fact or conclusions of law. Thus, a party cannot take exception to it. <u>See</u> § 120.57(1)(*l*), Fla. Stat. Therefore, the Agency must deny Petitioner's first exception.

In its second exception (titled Payment of the Fine), Petitioner takes exception to the findings of fact in Paragraphs 8-14 of the Recommended Order, arguing that these paragraphs "present a disputed cumulative conclusions of facts." Petitioner's argument is not a valid reason for the Agency to reject or modify the findings of fact in these paragraphs. The findings of fact in Paragraphs 8-14 of the Recommended Order are based on competent, substantial evidence.

See Transcript, Pages 107-120 and 123-134; Respondent's Exhibit J; and the January 16, 2015, April 17, 2015 and May 5, 2015 Orders entered in DCA Case No. 1D14-5427, which were officially recognized by the ALJ pursuant to written order entered on July 2, 2015. Thus, the Agency is not permitted to reject or modify them. See § 120.57(1)(*l*), Fla. Stat.; Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that an agency "may not reject the hearing officer's finding [of fact] unless there is no competent, substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred"). Therefore, the Agency must deny Petitioner's second exception.

In its third and final exception (titled Compliance with Background Screening), Petitioner takes exception to the findings of fact in Paragraphs 17-23 of the Recommended Order, arguing that these paragraphs also "present a disputed cumulative conclusion of facts." Petitioner's argument does not constitute a valid reason for the Agency to reject or modify the findings of fact in these paragraphs. The findings of fact in Paragraphs 17-23 of the Recommended Order are based on competent, substantial evidence. See Transcript, Pages 51-66 and 71-75; Respondent's Exhibits D, E, F, G, H and I. Thus, the Agency cannot disturb them. See § 120.57(1)(*l*), Fla. Stat.; Heifetz, 475 So. 2d at 1281. Therefore, the Agency denies Petitioner's third exception.

Respondent's Exceptions

In its exceptions to the Recommended Order, Respondent takes exception to the conclusions of law in Paragraphs 25 and 27 of the Recommended Order, arguing that the ALJ wrongly concluded that the Agency was seeking to deny Petitioner's licensure renewal application as a penalty for two violations, and thus applied the wrong burden of proof in these paragraphs, which means that the proceedings on which the conclusions of law in these

paragraphs are based did not comply with the essential requirements of law. While the phrase "did not comply with the essential requirements of law" is contained in the sentence of section 120.57(1)(*l*), Florida Statutes, that pertains to the rejection or modification of findings of fact, the Agency asserts failure to comply with the essential requirements of law is also a valid reason for the Agency to reject or modify the ALJ's incorrect determination of the burden of proof in a licensure case, which is a procedural issue that affects the proceedings as a whole, and is closely tied to the Agency's discretion to determine the fitness of licensure applications, pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in Department of Children and Families v. Davis Family Day Care Home, 160 So. 3d 854, 856-57 (Fla. 2015) and Department of Banking and Finance v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996).

As section 429.01(3), Florida Statutes, states, an assisted living facility license is a public trust and a privilege, not an entitlement. Thus, Petitioner ultimately bears the burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, in proving that it meets all the requirements for re-licensure, and any conclusion of law to the contrary is clear legal error. Any conclusion of law to the contrary goes against the Florida Supreme Court's opinions in Davis and Osborne Stern. In Davis, which re-affirmed the Osborne Stern case, the Court stated that "[i]n Osborne Stern, this Court clarified that it is the nature of the agency's action and the underlying rights implicated by the action that govern the applicable evidentiary standard." Id at 857. Thus, the Court found that "the Second District correctly recognized that '[t]he holding of Osborne [Stern] was that the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, not the clear and convincing burden, is applicable to license application proceedings.'" Id. The Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in Davis and Osborne Stern applies with equal persuasiveness to both initial and renewal licensure denials. Indeed, as the First District Court of Appeal observed in Terrell Oil Co. v. Department of Transportation,

541 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), license renewal proceedings are not penal because they do not have the effect of suspending or revoking a license. Id. at 715. There is "a qualitative difference between the type of order ... that denies renewal of a license that has expired or is about to expire and one which suspends or revokes an active license." Id.

This same reasoning is also found in the case of Lauderhill Family Care Retirement Residence, Inc. d/b/a Lauderhill Family Care Retirement v. Agency for Health Care Administration, DOAH Case No. 14-0435 (AHCA 2014), which is very similar to the case at hand. In that case, the ALJ upheld the Agency's denial of an assisted living facility's licensure renewal application based on the fact that the facility failed to have a satisfactory biennial licensure survey, and the fact that the controlling interest of the facility was the controlling interest of a facility that had an unpaid fine and its license revoked. The facility argued that the Agency should have to prove the allegations that formed the basis of its denial by clear and convincing evidence, but the ALJ rejected that argument stating "[t]his is not a disciplinary proceeding to revoke the license of Petitioner. Rather, this proceeding is to determine whether Petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that it met the criteria applicable for re-licensure." See Endnote 5 of the Recommended Order. The ALJ concluded that "[a]s an applicant for a license, Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this proceeding to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it satisfied all the requirements for licensure and was entitled to receive the license." See Paragraph 45 of the Recommended Order.

The ALJ in this case incorrectly relied on the case of Coke v. Department of Children and Family Services, 704 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), instead of following the correct reasoning in the Davis and Osborne Stern cases. Coke has no bearing on this matter because, in Coke, DCF "agree[d] that in this proceeding it had the burden of proving [Coke's] lack of entitlement

to a renewal of her license and that the evidence needed to be clear and convincing." Here, the Agency did not call its January 21, 2015 Second Amended Notice of Intent to Deny for Renewal an "administrative complaint," nor did the Agency agree that it bore the burden of proving the violations alleged in the January 21, 2015 Second Amended Notice of Intent to Deny for Renewal by clear and convincing evidence. Had the ALJ followed the reasoning in Davis and Osborne Stern, the burden of proof would have remained with Petitioner to prove it met all requirements to have its license renewed by a preponderance of the evidence. § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. Though the outcome recommended by the ALJ will not change as a result, the Agency feels compelled to correct the ALJ's error in this regard in order to avoid confusion in future cases.

Thus, upon review of the entire record and the Davis and Osborne Stern cases, the Agency finds that the ALJ did not comply with the essential requirements of law when he used the incorrect burden of proof in Paragraphs 25 and 27of the Recommended Order. The Agency further finds that it has substantive jurisdiction over the conclusions of law in these paragraphs because it is the single state agency responsible for the licensure and regulation of assisted living facilities in Florida, and that it can substitute conclusions of law that are as or more reasonable than those of the ALJ. Therefore, the Agency grants Respondent's exception, rejects the conclusions of law in Paragraph 27 (and, by extension, Paragraphs 26 and 28 also) and modifies the conclusions of law in Paragraph 25 of the Recommended Order are modified as follows:

> 25. In this proceeding, the Agency seeks to deny renewal of Flo-Ronke's license to operate an ALF. ~~It does this to impose a penalty for two violations by Flo-Ronke. The Agency seems to accept that it bears the burden of presenting evidence of the violations. This is correct, although the applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion, when an agency is denying initial licensure because of violations of statutes. See~~ In accordance with the principles set forth in Dept. Banking and Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v.

> Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996), Flo-Ronke bears the ultimate burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that its license should be renewed notwithstanding the reasons the Agency gave for denying Flo-Ronke's licensure renewal application. ~~("[T]he Department had the burden of presenting evidence that appellants had violated certain statutes and were thus unfit for registration.").~~ See also, Davis v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 160 So. 3d 854, 857 (Fla. 2015).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Agency adopts the findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Agency adopts the conclusions of law set forth in the Recommended Order, except where noted supra.

ORDER

1. Petitioner's licensure renewal application is hereby denied. The parties shall govern themselves accordingly.

2. In order to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of Petitioner's clients, the denial of Petitioner's licensure renewal application is stayed for 30 days from the filing date of this Final Order for the sole purpose of allowing the safe and orderly discharge of clients. § 408.815(6), Fla. Stat. Petitioner is prohibited from accepting any new admissions during this period and must immediately notify the clients that they will soon be discharged. Petitioner must comply with all other applicable federal and state laws. At the conclusion of the stay, or upon the discontinuance of operations, whichever is first, Petitioner shall promptly return the license certificate which is the subject of this agency action to the appropriate licensure unit in Tallahassee, Florida. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-35.040(5).

3. In accordance with Florida law, Petitioner is responsible for retaining and

appropriately distributing all client records within the timeframes prescribed in the authorizing statutes and applicable administrative code provisions. Petitioner is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes.

4. In accordance with Florida law, Petitioner is responsible for any refunds that may have to be made to the clients.

5. Petitioner is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. Petitioner is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. Petitioner should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. Petitioner is notified that the denial of its licensure renewal application may have ramifications potentially affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on this 15 day of January, ~~2015.~~ 2016



ELIZABETH DUDEK, Secretary
AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW, WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING THE ORIGINAL NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A COPY, ALONG WITH THE FILING FEE PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this 13th day of January, 2016.



RICHARD J. SHOOP, Agency Clerk
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Copies furnished to:

Jan Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)	Catherine Anne Avery, Unit Manager Assisted Living Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)

Finance & Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)	Theresa DeCanio, Field Office Manager Area 7 Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)
Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)	Florence Akintola, Administrator Flo-Ronke, Inc. 1513 East Ellicott Street Tampa, Florida 33610 (U.S. Mail)
Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)	Rawsi Williams, Esquire Rawsi Williams Law Group Wells Fargo Center 333 Southeast 2nd Avenue, Suite 2000 Miami, Florida 33131 (via electronic mail to rawsi@rawsi.com)
Honorable John D. C. Newton II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (electronic filing)	Lindsay Worsham Granger, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail)

NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW

408.804 License required; display.--

(1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider.

(2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The

license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued.

408.812 Unlicensed activity. --

(1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license.

(2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency.

(3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense.

(4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance.

(5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation.

(6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules.

(7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.

STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FLO-RONKE, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 15-0982

AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE
ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.
_________________________________/

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Administrative Law Judge John D. C. Newton, II, of the Division of Administrative Hearings conducted the final hearing in this matter on August 3, 2015, by video teleconference at locations in Tampa and Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Rawsi Williams, Esquire
Rawsi Williams Law Group
Suite 2000
333 Southeast 2nd Avenue
Miami, Florida 33131

For Respondent: Lindsay Worsham Granger, Esquire
Agency for Health Care Administration
2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3
Tallahassee, Florida 32308

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Fact Issues

1. Did Petitioner, Flo-Ronke, Inc. (Flo-Ronke), fail to timely pay a fine imposed by Final Order of the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency)?

2. Did the Agency reject attempts by Flo-Ronke to timely pay the fine in full by a single payment without conditions?

3. Did Flo-Ronke attempt to pay the fine untimely in full by a single payment without conditions? If so, did the Agency reject the proffered payment?

4. Did Flo-Ronke employ an individual in a position that required background screening who had a disqualifying criminal conviction?

Law Issues

5. Which party bears the burden of proof?

6. What is the standard of proof?

7. Do the facts support denying re-licensure of Flo-Ronke?

8. Are untimely efforts to pay the fine in full with a single payment mitigating factors? If so, how should the factors be weighed?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This proceeding began with a Notice of Intent to Deny for Renewal of the assisted living facility license of Flo-Ronke filed December 3, 2014. Flo-Ronke requested a formal hearing to

challenge the proposed action. The Agency referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) to conduct the hearing. It was set for final hearing to be held April 28, 2015.

The Agency later issued a Second Amended Notice of Intent to Deny for Renewal, substituted for the original notice in this proceeding. Upon a Joint Motion for Continuance, the hearing was rescheduled for August 3, 2015.

The Agency twice moved to relinquish jurisdiction of the charge that Flo-Ronke had not paid a fine imposed by Final Order. Flo-Ronke repeatedly asserted in its responses to the motions that the Agency had refused to accept payment. Based upon these assertions, in papers filed and during a motion hearing, the motions to relinquish jurisdiction were denied.

On July 2, 2015, the undersigned issued an Order Requiring a Clear Statement of Defense. The Order directed Flo-Ronke to provide: "A plain, clear, and unequivocal statement of whether Flo-Ronke maintains that it tendered an immediate, single, full, and complete payment of the fine assessed by Final Order in AHCA Cases 2014002513 and 2014002514 and that the Agency refused to accept the tendered immediate, single, full, and complete payment of the fines." It also required Flo-Ronke to provide additional information such as a description of the evidence supporting the claim that payment had been tendered and refused. In a rambling six-page response to the Order, Flo-Ronke asserted that the

Agency had refused to accept full and complete payment of the fine when tendered. As with Flo-Ronke's other pleadings, the response attacks the Agency and its counsel with unsupported accusations of maliciousness and dishonesty.

On July 24, 2015, the Agency filed an Unequivocal Statement of Agency Policy. The statement said that the Agency stood ready to accept full payment of the fine. The letter to Flo-Ronke's attorney attached to the statement asked Flo-Ronke to tender immediate, full, and complete payment within 48 hours.

The hearing was conducted as scheduled. The Agency offered testimony from Sherry Ledbetter, Laura Manville, Lois Markham, Edwin David Selby, and Keisha Woods. Agency Exhibits A through J were admitted into evidence. Flo-Ronke offered testimony from Florence Akintola and Scott J. Flint. Flo-Ronke's Exhibits 2, 4, 6, and 7 were admitted. The undersigned took official recognition of the docket in First District Court of Appeal Case No. 1D14-5427 and three orders entered in that proceeding. The orders are: (1) an Order rendered January 16, 2015, dismissing the appeal for Flo-Ronke's failure to respond to an Order requiring it to obtain counsel to represent it before the court; (2) an Order rendered April 17, 2015, denying Flo-Ronke's motion to re-open the case; (3) and an Order rendered May 5, 2015, denying Flo-Ronke's motion for reconsideration, clarification, written opinion, and for stay. Case No. 1D14-5427 is Flo-Ronke's

appeal of the Agency's Final Order in DOAH Case No. 14-1939 (Agency cases 2014002513 and 2014002514). The undersigned also took official notice of the file in DOAH Case No. 14-1939.

The Agency timely filed its proposed recommended order. Flo-Ronke did not. On September 11, 2015, 11 days after the proposed recommended orders were due, Flo-Ronke filed a document titled "Petitioner's Notice of Intent to File (Proposed) Recommended Order." On September 15, 2015, Flo-Ronke filed its Proposed Recommended Order. The Agency moved to strike the Proposed Recommended Order. Flo-Ronke filed a paper titled "Objection to Respondent's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Recommended Order." On October 7, 2015, the undersigned rendered an Order Striking Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order.

On August 28, 2015, the Agency filed Agency's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Flo-Ronke filed a document titled "Petitioner's Motion to Strike/Objection to Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs" on September 4, 2015.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Flo-Ronke is an Assisted Living Facility (ALF). An ALF is a building, part of a building, or a residential facility that provides "housing, meals, and one or more personal services for a period exceeding 24 hours to one or more adults who are not relatives of the owner or administrator." § 429.02(5), Fla. Stat. (2015).[1/] The Agency licenses and regulates ALFs.

§§ 429.04 and 429.07, Fla. Stat. Flo-Ronke is subject to the Agency's licensure requirements and is licensed by it.

2. By Notice of Intent to Deny Renewal Application dated December 2, 2014, the Agency denied Flo-Ronke's application to renew its license on the grounds that Flo-Ronke "failed to comply with the criminal background screening requirements by employing a caretaker who was not eligible to work in the facility." On January 8, 2015, the Agency amended the Notice of Intent to Deny. On January 21, 2015, the Agency issued a Second Amended Notice of Intent to Intent to Deny for Renewal. This notice is the subject of this proceeding.

3. The second amended notice asserts two bases for denial. One is the originally asserted background screening violation. The other is Flo-Ronke's failure to pay an outstanding fine in AHCA Cases 2014002513 and 2014002514.

Payment of the Fine

4. In AHCA Cases 2014002513 and 2014002514, the Agency's Administrative Complaint charged Flo-Ronke with four deficiencies involving insects, cleanliness, medication administration, and inadequate staffing. Originally, Flo-Ronke requested an evidentiary hearing before DOAH (DOAH Case No. 14-1939). Later, Flo-Ronke, through its owner Ms. Akintola, agreed there were no disputed issues of facts and stipulated to returning the matter to the Agency for an informal hearing.

5. The Agency provided Flo-Ronke an opportunity for a hearing. No representative of Flo-Ronke appeared at the hearing. The Agency issued a Final Order on November 5, 2014, upholding the Administrative Complaint and imposing a $13,500 fine. The Agency's Final Order included instructions on how to make the payment, advised that the payment was due within 30 days of the Final Order, and cautioned that interest would be imposed on overdue amounts. The Final Order included a Notice of Right to Judicial Review.

6. On behalf of Flo-Ronke, Ms. Akintola appealed the Final Order pro se. The Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide for an automatic stay of a decision if it is appealed. Flo-Ronke did not seek a stay of the Final Order. Consequently, the obligation to pay the fine was effective as of the date of the Final Order.

7. The First District Court of Appeal rendered an Order requiring Flo-Ronke to obtain counsel for the appeal because a corporation cannot be represented by an employee or officer. Flo-Ronke did not obtain counsel or respond to the court's Order. On January 16, 2015, the court dismissed Flo-Ronke's appeal.

8. On April 9, 2015, Flo-Ronke, represented by the same counsel as in this proceeding, moved to re-open the appellate case. On April 17, 2015, the court denied the motion. It also

denied Flo-Ronke's subsequent motion seeking reconsideration, clarification, a written opinion, and a stay.

9. From the date that the Agency entered the Final Order imposing the fine in DOAH Case No. 14-1939 (AHCA Cases 2014002513 and 2014002514) to the date of the final hearing, Flo-Ronke did not pay the fine.

10. Starting around February 2015, attorney Scott Flint tried, on Flo-Ronke's behalf, to arrange a payment plan for the fine. He discussed the proposal with Agency Attorney Edwin Selby. Mr. Flint linked the discussions to resolving a separate investigation of Flo-Ronke that the Agency was conducting. Mr. Flint never offered unconditional payment of the fine on behalf of Flo-Ronke.

11. Mr. Flint testified that at some point during conversations about the two cases, Mr. Selby said the Agency would not accept full payment if it was offered. Mr. Selby testified that he did not make this statement. Mr. Selby's testimony is more credible in this instance, as it is in other instances when Mr. Selby's testimony differed from Mr. Flint's.

12. One reason Mr. Selby's testimony is more credible is that on February 11, 2015, after the time Mr. Flint says Mr. Selby made the statement, Mr. Flint wrote Mr. Selby a letter proposing an installment plan for paying the fine. The letter did not mention the alleged statement that the Agency would not

accept payment. The proposal and the failure to mention the alleged refusal are inconsistent with the assertion that Mr. Selby said payment would not be accepted. Also, Mr. Flint hedged his testimony about the alleged refusals, noting that lawyers say many things during negotiations. Mr. Selby's testimony about conversations after the February 11 letter is also more credible.

13. Mr. Selby never said that the Agency would not accept full payment if it were tendered.

14. The clear and convincing evidence proves that from the date the Agency entered the Final Order to the date of the final hearing, Flo-Ronke never tendered full and complete payment of the fine to the Agency.

15. Flo-Ronke, despite its assertions during pre-hearing motion practice, did not offer any evidence that could be reasonably be interpreted as proving that Flo-Ronke tendered full payment of the fine or that the Agency refused the payment. Even Mr. Flint's testimony, if fully credited, is not evidence that Flo-Ronke tendered full payment or that the Agency refused full payment.

Background Screening

16. At all relevant times, Florida law required level two background screening of any person seeking employment with a provider whose responsibilities may require him to provide personal care or other services directly to clients or who will

have access to the client living area. § 408.809(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2014). Individuals who have disqualifying offenses may not hold positions where they provide services to clients or will have access to client living areas. Florida law also requires re-screening every five years after employment. § 408.809(2), Fla. Stat. (2014).

17. Agency surveyor, Laura Manville, surveyed Flo-Ronke and its records on September 2, 2014. At that time, F.M. was employed there. Flo-Ronke employed F.M. since at least 2009. F.M.'s duties included caring for residents. In addition, even when performing non-caretaking duties, such as grounds-keeping and maintenance, F.M. had unsupervised access to the residents and their living area.

18. F.M. was adjudicated guilty of a disqualifying sex offense on October 28, 1999.

19. Flo-Ronke's records did not document the required level 2 background screening of F.M. when reviewed on September 2, 2014. At that time, Ms. Manville told Ms. Akintola of the deficiency and that F.M. was not eligible to work at the ALF. This was not the first time the Agency advised Ms. Akintola of the deficiency.

20. By letter dated October 2, 2009, the Agency advised that background screening of F.M. had revealed he had a disqualifying criminal offense. It advised Flo-Ronke that it

must either terminate the employment of F.M. or obtain an exemption from disqualification. Flo-Ronke did neither.

21. Ms. Manville conducted a follow-up survey on September 10, 2014. Despite the notice given on September 2, 2014, F.M. was still present at the facility performing grounds work and had access to client living areas.

22. Ms. Akintola presented testimony and a single document attempting to prove that F.M. passed background screening in 2010. The document appears to show a determination of no background screening violation in 2010. Why it differs from other documents from 2009 and after 2010 is not explained. The circumstances surrounding the document are somewhat mysterious. It does not appear in the Agency files. On September 2, 2014, Ms. Akintola did not mention it. On that day, she said she thought F.M. did not need to satisfy screening requirements because he had worked for so long at Flo-Ronke.

23. More importantly, the issue is whether F.M. was employed in 2014 in violation of the background screening requirements. The clear and convincing evidence, including evidence of the conviction in the background screening database, the continued employment of F.M. after September 2, 2014, and the letter of October 2, 2009, proves that in 2014 F.M. had a disqualifying offense and did not have an exemption from the disqualification.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

24. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat.

Burden and Standard of Proof

25. In this proceeding, the Agency seeks to deny renewal of Flo-Ronke's license to operate an ALF. It does this to impose a penalty for two violations by Flo-Ronke. The Agency seems to accept that it bears the burden of presenting evidence of the violations. This is correct, although the applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion, when an agency is denying initial licensure because of violations of statutes. See Dept. Banking and Fin., Div. of Sec. & Investor Prot. v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996) ("[T]he Department had the burden of presenting evidence that appellants had violated certain statutes and were thus unfit for registration."). See also, Davis v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 160 So. 3d 854, 857 (Fla. 2015).

26. The Agency contends that proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof. It relies on Davis which held that, in cases where an agency denies initial licensure to an applicant because the applicant is unfit, the agency must prove its reasons by only a preponderance of the evidence.

27. This case is a license renewal case, not an initial licensure case as in Davis. It involves allegations of wrongdoing by the licensed facility and termination of Flo-Ronke's ability to operate an ALF. Although the context is license renewal, the action is to impose a penalty for violation of the law. Consequently, the proper burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Coke v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 704 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Applying the standard for initial licensure when an agency denies renewal because of alleged wrongdoing would allow an agency to manipulate the system to avoid the clear and convincing standard by denying renewal rather than instituting a disciplinary action. See Posey v. Fla. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm., Case No. 89-4700 (Fla. DOAH, January 3, 1990, P. 12), ("Once a determination is made by the Department that Petitioner's licenses can be revoked based upon the trial court's disposition of the misdemeanor, the Department must treat its decision not to renew the licenses as a revocation proceeding.").

28. The burden of proof for ALF licensure is not established by statute or an issue committed to the Agency by the Legislature. It is a procedural matter governed by case law, not one over which the Legislature has given the Agency substantive jurisdiction. G.E.L. Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 875 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). In this case, since the Agency proved

its allegations by clear and convincing evidence, the result is the same regardless of which standard of proof is applied.

Violations

29. Section 408.831(1)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Agency to deny an application for renewal when an applicant has not paid all outstanding fines imposed by an agency final order that is not subject to further appeal. The clear and convincing evidence proved that Flo-Ronke did not pay the $13,500 fine imposed by final order of the Agency. The evidence of this offense and governing law support denying Flo-Ronke's application for renewal.

30. Section 429.14(1) authorizes the Agency to deny a license application for failure to comply with background screening standards of section 408.809(1). The Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that Flo-Ronke failed to comply with background screening requirements. The evidence and the governing law support denying Flo-Ronke's renewal application for this failure.

Fees and Costs

31. The Agency moves under sections 57.105 and 120.595, Florida Statutes, for an award of attorney's fees and costs. Section 57.105 provides for an award of fees and costs to a prevailing party and imposition of sanctions against a party for raising and advancing unsupported claims or defenses.

32. Section 120.595 provides for award of attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party in a proceeding before DOAH if the Administrative Law Judge determines that the non-prevailing party participated in a proceeding for an improper purpose.

33. At this point in the proceedings, a final order has not been issued. Therefore, there is not yet a prevailing party. Ruling upon the Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs would be premature. Consequently, jurisdiction over the motion is being retained.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying the application of Flo-Ronke, Inc., for renewal of its ALF license. Jurisdiction over the Motion for Fees and Costs is retained for further appropriate proceedings once the prevailing party has been determined.

DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.



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Filed with the Clerk of the
Division of Administrative Hearings
this 30th day of October, 2015.

ENDNOTE

[1/] All citations to the Florida Statutes are to the 2015 codification.

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.